Whether history repeats itself or jives to the tune of economic and socio-political forces, the American philosopher George Santayana got it right when he said that “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” A recent opinion piece in The New York Times (NYT) by William Dalrymple, the well-known author of several books on India’s colonial history, is a reminder of that warning. The past that must be remembered in America today, according to him, is the history of the British East India Company (BEIC) – how it became a de facto state, and what it took to curtail its power.
Dalrymple argues that Big Tech is doing something similar to what the BEIC did a couple of centuries ago. If “great corporations can enrich the state…they can also drag it down,” he warns, “becoming powerful enough to overcome entire nation-states and to make or break not just their economies but their militaries, too.” The eight big companies referred to as Big Tech are Nvidia, Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Tesla, and SpaceX.
Given that the combined market valuation of these eight companies is more than 25 trillion, roughly about 80 per cent of America’s GDP, he does have a point.
For those unfamiliar with the role BEIC played in creating and consolidating the power of the British Empire, Dalrymple provides essential details. He points out that in terms of economic power, in its heyday BEIC was Britain’s biggest corporation and largest employer. Its stock was the pillar of British public finance, and it built much of the London docks.
Though lording over India was its visible face, about a quarter of the Government’s annual expenditure in Britain was borne by it. In maritime trade, about three-quarters of the tonnage transported between Europe and Asia was controlled by BEIC. Its significant military power helped the British Government in no small measure in the opium wars.
Elon Musk, currently the world’s richest man and owner of SpaceX and Tesla, reminds Dalrymple of Warren Hastings, the first British governor general of India: he was “the greatest corporate oligarch of his day, the Elon Musk of 18th-century London”. If the BEIC controlled about three-quarters of the tonnage transported between Europe and Asia, SpaceX today owns about two-thirds of the satellites used to store and communicate data, a critical requirement for showcasing AI’s power in geopolitical conflicts.
In the late 17th century, BEIC started with bribery and insider trading to increase its political power. It soon shifted to a more sophisticated tool: crony capitalism through corporate lobbying. More than a fifth of BEIC’s directors were in Parliament at some point, and about 40 per cent of the parliamentarians were its shareholders.
It got into the opium trade in the 1780s and participated in the Opium Wars to seize an offshore base at Hong Kong. It soon became the largest drug cartel in history. By 1803, it had an army about twice the size of the British standing army. However, in 1857 its ruthless exploitation led to India’s “First War of Independence”. Shaken, the Company’s ruling powers over India were transferred to the British Crown.
Given this historical background, a layperson may understandably ask what historical forces enabled a trading company to become such a fearsome colonial superpower. A short and, to my mind, incomplete answer from the opinion piece is that “Mughal India’(s)…bejewelled loot helped power Britain into the Industrial Revolution …commerce, colonization and brute corporate power walked in lock step” (italics added).
This is too brief an answer about power as it misses out some vital details. It fails to mention the cruelty and violence – the origin and constant companion of power, both physical and social. The foundation of the Industrial Revolution was violence inflicted by brute power. However, as it unfolded in history, is became a saga of converting technological power into ideological power for profit. As one had pointed out earlier in another article, the “confluence of physical power with that of ideological power was most apparent when Britain used coal-fired, steam engine-driven warships against China in the first Opium War of 1839”.
Two recent books, both written by professional academics, provide many of the missing details. The first one, called “Empire of Guns: The violent making of the Industrial Revolution,” is by Priya Satia, who places the city of Birmingham at the centre of her narrative. She points out that Birmingham’s metal trades and arms manufacturing were established before Manchester’s textile industry drove Britain’s industrial growth.
Furthermore, during the period 1688 – 1815, military procurement accounted for about eighty per cent of the British government’s spending, contributing critically to what has come to be known as the Industrial Revolution. Satia also examines the ideological implications and cultural impacts of gun making and tells the story of a well-known Quaker gun maker in Birmingham, Samuel Galton. He justified gun making, though non-participation in war was integral to the Quaker faith, by invoking a version of nationalism. She also points out that, beyond physical power, guns were valued as status symbols and gifts throughout the British Empire.
The second book, “The Killing Age: How Violence Made the Modern World”, by Clifton Harris addresses the ideological aspect head on, and says “capitalism’s ‘big bang’ – a turning point in the history of the planet – emerged out of nothing less and nothing more than the globalised use of violence to make money”. Mr Harris argues convincingly that slavery created capitalism, and the technology of gun making provided a huge boost to the slave trade.
The global spread of weapons, the Atlantic slave trade, and slavery across the Indian Ocean shared a synergy that created warlords in many countries. These men sought to profit from selling modern weapons and using them to generate wealth or extract labour from others. Mr Harris describes both Robert Clive, who won the Battle of Plassey in 1757, and Warren Hastings, who was mentioned earlier, as warlords and not mere leaders of the BEIC.
Like Ms Satia, he also points out that the beginning of the Industrial Revolution had less to do with pumping water out of coal mines, or with spinning thread and weaving cloth than with making weapons. From about the 1750s, weapons and Indian saltpetre (potassium nitrate), an essential and major component of gunpowder, were two of BEIC’s most important trade goods. In the next century, over 30,000 tons of potassium nitrate made its way to England yearly: enough for anywhere between 1 billion and 3 billion musket shots, and for an 18-pounder cannon to lob more than 300 million balls.
Weapon manufacturing on this scale is part of the history of physical power. It was possible only because of the steam engines of James Watt and his business partner Mathew Boulton. The latter is said to have told a visitor to his factory, “I sell here, sir, what all the world desires to have—POWER.” It is worth noting though, that the decade that began with Watt’s work on quantifying power, ended in the French revolution of 1789, replacing “kingly” power with “revolutionary” power.
Returning to Santayana’s famous quote at the beginning, is America then condemned to repeat the mistakes of the British Empire? Dalrymple believes “The instruments” to avoid such an outcome “still exist”. He gives the recent example of Chinese regulatory authorities that acted swiftly and effectively in taming Alibaba and restructuring Ant Group over a short period of three years.
This is like comparing apples with oranges. The reach and nature of the regulatory powers, and the speed with which they deliver results, depend on a country’s historical legacies and ideological orientation. What worked in a country with a relatively recent history of revolution, a single-party governance system, and largely a command economy cannot be replicated effectively, if at all, in a democracy where faith in “the invisible hand” of the market is supreme.
The recent mid-term poll results in America may indicate that some changes are on the offing. However, in a world haunted by crony capitalism and the enormous power of the digital financial complex, such changes are unlikely to make much difference in the near future. More importantly, given the state of the world today, the recent pandemic, and imminent climate change, the real question is whether the human race is condemned to repeat the mistakes of the past centuries.
The single lesson from the history of the last century is that “Our world risks both explosion and implosion.” In the early 20th century, the commodification and disembodiment of land, labour, and money from society for profit led to the accumulation of fictitious capital beyond the global economy’s capacity to absorb. The tension between the market and society eventually reached a breaking point, manifesting as two World Wars, fascism, and revolutions. In other words, both explosion and implosion followed.
Today, the power that the digital financial complex enjoys comes from the massive commodification of data, including personal data, without societal sanction. The pushback by people against that commodification started late but is now global.
Unlike financial capital, material sources of energy such as fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas) are tangible capital. Fossil fuels have been the world’s main source of energy for almost 200 years. Even today, close to 85 per cent of the energy the world consumes comes from fossil fuels. The turn to oil in the twentieth century made the United States the world’s dominant power and played a vital role in geopolitics ever since. That geopolitical story of power was on full display during the Suez crisis of 1956, and now in the twenty-first century in both Iran and Ukraine.
The risks of implosion and explosion could be minimised only by an ideology that puts societal well-being, rather than profit, at its core and makes room for a multipolar world on the geopolitical stage. It must not be forgotten that the world today has nine countries that possess nuclear weapons. In other words, the risk of explosion includes the risk of a nuclear explosion. An ideological refusal to accept that reality and its interconnectedness withcolonialism, inequality, and global warming, would almost certainly lead to disastrous consequences.
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