Donald Trump claims he can prevent Iran from ever acquiring nuclear weapons. What has followed, instead, is far more consequential. In choosing to strike Iran, he has set off a chain of events that led Tehran to do what it had long threatened but never actually carried out—assert control over the Strait of Hormuz.
For decades, Iran has invoked its control over the narrow waterway in speeches and warnings. However, it remained open as a vital corridor for global energy trade. Now it is no longer simply a hypothetical lever. Iran has taken hold of it, and there is every indication that this grip will endure well beyond the end of the current conflict.
Before the fighting began, the strait functioned as it always had: a passage through which a significant portion of the world’s oil and gas flowed without interruption. The war, presented by the United States and Israel as a mission to reshape Iran’s political system and liberate its people from authoritarian rule, has instead produced a starkly different reality.
Nearly fifty days into the conflict, the strait remains closed, and Washington finds itself in the awkward position of urging Tehran to reopen it. Trump’s approach—marked by warnings and threats—has so far failed to achieve that aim. The gap between stated objectives and actual outcomes has become difficult to ignore.
What has emerged is a reversal of expectations. Rather than weakening Iran’s position, the conflict has handed it a powerful new form of influence. Control over the Strait of Hormuz gives Tehran the ability to affect the global economy in immediate and tangible ways.
Energy markets depend heavily on the steady movement of oil and gas through that corridor. By interrupting or regulating that flow, Iran has effectively positioned itself to extract concessions and generate income. This is not a temporary advantage that will disappear when hostilities end; it is a structural shift that could shape regional and global dynamics for years to come.
Iran’s leaders appear to understand the magnitude of this opportunity. Reports from recent negotiations suggest that Tehran has begun to treat authority over the strait as a central element of its long-term strategy. Its representatives have even included recognition of this control among their formal demands in discussions with the United States. It signals an intention to convert a wartime development into a permanent feature of the geopolitical landscape. The Strait is no longer a bargaining chip; it is a cornerstone of Iran’s approach to power and security.
The benefits of this position are multifaceted. The most immediate is financial. By introducing modest fees for ships passing through the strait, Iran has opened up a substantial new stream of revenue. The charges themselves are relatively small—around one dollar per barrel of oil, or as much as two million dollars per tanker. However, the volume of traffic means the total adds up quickly.
Estimates suggest that Iran could earn roughly six hundred million dollars each month from oil shipments alone, with an additional eight hundred million dollars coming from natural gas. Over the course of a year, the sums become enormous, especially given that neighbouring Gulf states would bear a large share of these costs. Economists estimate that as much as eighty per cent of the toll burden would fall on those countries, amounting to fourteen billion dollars annually for oil transit alone.
The United States has tried to counter this development by asserting its own control over the waterway. Officials in the Trump administration have pointed to instances in which ships have complied with directives to turn around, presenting these as evidence that their strategy is working.
One such case involved a Chinese-owned tanker that reversed course in the Gulf of Oman. But these examples do little to change the broader picture. Iran continues to insist that it is the final authority in the strait, determining which vessels may pass and under what conditions. Its warnings have been explicit: if its ports come under threat, it will respond in a way that endangers maritime access throughout the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman.
Regardless of how this standoff evolves in the short term, the longer-term balance appears to favour Iran. Maintaining influence over a narrow, strategically located passage is inherently simpler than enforcing a wide-ranging blockade in international waters.
Even with support from allies—support that is unlikely to materialise—the United States would face significant logistical and financial challenges in sustaining such an effort. The costs would not be limited to military expenditures; disruptions to energy flows would ripple through the global economy, affecting prices and stability far beyond the immediate region.
In this sense, the situation begins to resemble a historical pattern in which great powers encounter the limits of their reach at critical chokepoints. The Strait of Hormuz risks becoming a symbol not of dominance, but of constraint. It highlights how geography can shape outcomes in ways that even the most powerful states struggle to overcome. What was intended as a demonstration of strength may instead reveal vulnerabilities.
Another dimension of Iran’s new position lies in its security implications. By showing that it can disrupt a vital artery of global energy supply, Tehran has effectively raised the stakes for any future military action against it.
The threat is no longer confined to missiles or conventional forces; it extends to the economic consequences that would follow any escalation. This creates a form of deterrence rooted not in confrontation, but in the potential for widespread disruption. Countries that rely on stable energy supplies must now factor this risk into their calculations.
The geopolitical effects extend even further. Control over the strait enhances Iran’s ability to engage with countries across the Global South, many of which depend heavily on imported energy. By offering access—or threatening to restrict it—Tehran can encourage these nations to deepen economic ties and potentially sidestep U.S. sanctions. This adds another layer to its influence, allowing it to build relationships that might otherwise have been constrained by international pressure.
The question of how China will respond to this evolving situation is particularly significant. China purchases more than eighty per cent of Iran’s oil, making it deeply invested in the stability of these supply routes. So far, Beijing has shown little inclination to pressure Tehran into loosening its grip on the strait. Instead, it has criticised the American approach, with officials describing the blockade as both risky and irresponsible. While one Chinese tanker has turned back, others have continued to pass through under Iran’s new system, suggesting a willingness to adapt to the changed conditions.
China has worked to diversify its energy sources, reducing its dependence on any single route or supplier. It is also believed to have built up sufficient reserves to offset disruptions for several months. These measures provide a buffer that allows Beijing to navigate the current uncertainty without an immediate crisis.
Even so, it remains unclear whether China would accept a long-term arrangement in which transit through the strait is subject to ongoing fees and restrictions. Its official statements emphasise the importance of restoring normal navigation as soon as possible, hinting at potential tensions down the line.
Beyond the immediate issue of the strait, the conflict may accelerate broader shifts in regional alignments. Gulf states, observing the course of the war, may begin to question longstanding assumptions about security partnerships. The idea that close ties with the United States and cooperation with Israel automatically ensure protection has been called into doubt. As a result, these countries could seek to diversify their relationships, exploring new connections with other major powers.
China stands to benefit from this reassessment. Trade between Beijing and the Gulf states has already grown significantly, reaching roughly two hundred and fifty-seven billion dollars in 2024—surpassing the region’s combined trade with major Western economies.
At the same time, China has expanded its diplomatic role, helping to broker agreements and facilitate dialogue in ways that signal a broader ambition. Its involvement in mediating relations between regional rivals and its indirect participation in recent negotiations suggest a willingness to play a prominent part.
Looking ahead, Iran may try to build on this moment by promoting a regional security arrangement that relies less on external powers and more on local cooperation. In such a framework, China could act as a facilitator or guarantor, lending its influence without assuming a direct military role traditionally associated with the United States. If this vision takes shape, it would mark a profound shift in the balance of power, redefining how security is managed in one of the world’s most strategically important regions.
What began as an effort to constrain Iran has instead opened the door to a reconfiguration of influence, economics, and alliances. The Strait of Hormuz, once a symbol of vulnerability for Tehran, has become a source of strength. And the consequences of that transformation are only beginning to unfold.
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